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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of many states, including Alaska, governing the exercise
of the power of eminent domain by utilities and governmental agen-
cies, often restricts the interest that may be acquired in land to a mere
easement.I Similarly, a condemning agency typically receives only an
easement when it uses private property without formally invoking its
condemnation power and is forced to pay compensation to the land-
owner for such use under the doctrine of inverse condemnation. 2
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1. Alaska and several states have an express, general limitation that an easement
may be condemned for certain purposes such as utility lines. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.250 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1113 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-30-104 (1987). In other states, the restriction is inferred from the principle, often
embodied in state statute or constitution, that only so much property may be taken as
is necessary for a public use. See, e.g., Hallock v. State, 32 N.Y.2d 599, 605, 300
N.E.2d 430, 432, 347 N.Y.S.2d 60, 64 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 64 N.Y.2d 224,
474 N.E.2d 1178, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1984); Westrick v. The Peoples Natural Gas Co.,
103 Pa. Commw. 578, 581-82, 520 A.2d 963, 965-66 (1987). See also City of New
Ulm v. Schultz, 356 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (city had to demonstrate
that taking a fee interest in land was "reasonably necessary or convenient" for the
expansion of an airport). This general principle has also been recognized in Alaska.
See Williams v. City of Valdez, 603 P.2d 483, 491 (Alaska 1979).
2. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267-68 (1946) (temporary or per-
manent nature of an avigation easement); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 329
(1917) (easement for land flooded by government's dam); Davis v. United States, 295
F.2d 931, 934 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (avigation easement); Barr v. KAMO Electric Corp., 648
S.W.2d 616, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (easement for power line); Cochran v. City of
Charlotte, 53 N.C. App. 390, 406, 281 S.E.2d 179, 191 (1981) (avigation easement).
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Even where the type of estate in land to be taken is left to the discre-
tion of the condemning agency, easements are often taken rather than
a broader estate such as a fee simple. 3 An easement is the right of one
person to use another's real property for a specific purpose.4 It is to be
distinguished from the fee simple interest, which provides a person
with the maximum control over the disposition and use of real estate.5
It may be further distinguished from the leasehold which grants the
tenant the right to full enjoyment, possession and use of land for a
term. 6
The compensation mandated by state and federal constitutions
which condemnors must pay for the interests they acquire is typically,
but not always, said by the courts to be measured by an objective test
relying on "fair market value."'7 While there are markets for the fee or
leasehold interests, however, there is no market for an easement.8 The
judicial response to this circumstance, most recently illustrated in
Alaska in State v. Doyle,9 has been the development of a "before and
after" test and appraisal technique which calculates compensation as
the difference between the value of the original parcel before the ease-
ment has been imposed and the value after that interest is taken.' 0
3. See, e.g., United States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534, 536 (3d Cir.
1957); United States v. Kansas City, 159 F.2d 125, 129 (10th Cir. 1946); United States
v. 40.81 Acres o1 Land, 505 F. Supp. 151, 152 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Department of Pub.
Works and Bldg,;. v. Bozarth, 101 Ill. App. 2d 99, 101, 242 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Ct. App.
1968); Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Dahle, 285 Minn. 166, 170-71, 171 N.W.2d 813, 815-
16 (1969); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Argenbright, 457 S.W.2d 777, 784 (Mo. 1970).
4. Freightways Terminal Co. v. Industrial & Commercial Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d
977, 982 (Alaska 1963). See generally 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,
1 405 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1989); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT].
5. See, e.g., State ex reL. Ervin v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 139 So. 2d 135,
138 (Fla. 1962); Sterner v. Nelson, 210 Neb. 358, 368, 314 N.W.2d 263, 269 (1982).
For characteristics of the fee, see generally 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY, 1 179, 190 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1988); RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 14, 15.
Where the use authorized by the easement is so exclusive as to leave the owner of the
remaining estate with little meaningful interest in the land, the distinction has proved
difficult to make. Cf. St. Louis County v. St. Appalonia Corp., 471 S.W.2d 238, 246-
48 (Mo. 1971); Cappelli v. Justice, 262 Or. 120, 127-30, 496 P.2d 209, 212-13 (1972).
The fee simple estate in turn takes several distinct and well-known forms, see generally
2 R. POWELL, Id. 11 190[1] - 190[2]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 14-26, but
these further distinctions are irrelevant to the issues addressed here.
6. See, e.g., Town of Kearny v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 143 N.J.
Super. 449, 455-60, 363 A.2d 390, 393-96 (1976). See generally 2 R. POWELL, supra
note 5, 1 221[3][a]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 450 comment d.
7. See text infra at Section II.A and notes 17-19.
8. See text infra at Section IV and notes 57-59.
9. 735 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1987).
10. See text and notes infra at Sections IV and V.
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The deficiencies of this approach, which are apparent in Doyle, and a
proposed legislative solution are the subject of this article.
II. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Formal Condemnation
The nature and extent of the estate taken in the exercise of emi-
nent domain power depends upon the statute conferring the power. I I
The relevant Alaska statute permits the condemnor to take a fee sim-
ple interest only for public buildings, grounds, reservoirs and dams
and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, a place for the deposit of
debris or mine tailings and, when necessary in the judgment of the
Department of Natural Resources or the Department of Transporta-
tion and Public Facilities, for departmental purposes.12 The con-
demnor may acquire only an easement for any other purpose for
which condemnation is authorized, including, inter alia, telephone,
sewer, electric and natural gas utility facilities. 13 The general rule is
that only the estate reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose for which the property is taken may be acquired through
condemnation and compensation. 14 The policy is to require neither
the landowner to relinquish, nor the taxpayers to pay for, more than is
necessary. 15 Accordingly, statutes authorizing condemnation are con-
strued strictly against the condemnor.16
The compensation which the United States Constitution and state
constitutions require to be paid to the landowner is normally equated
with fair market value, or "the market value of the property at the
time of the taking."' 17 Fair market value is defined as "the amount of
money 'which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property
would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into
11. Williams v. City of Valdez, 603 P.2d 483, 491 (Alaska 1979).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.250(1) (1988).
13. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240 (1988) with ALASKA STAT.
§§ 09.55.250-(1)-(2) (1988).
14. See supra note 1.
15. Williams, 603 P.2d at 491 & n.24 (citing 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 9.22], at 9-17 to 9-18 (1978 & 1979 Supp.)).
16. Williams, 603 P.2d at 491; Laurel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transp., 180
Conn. 11, 31, 428 A.2d 789, 798 (1980), and cases cited in 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.2[1] n.15 (P. Rohan rev. 3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
17. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (quoting Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)); Gackstetter v. State, 618 P.2d 564, 567
(Alaska 1980). See also Department of Transp. v. Nalven, 455 So. 2d 301, 307 (Fla.
1984); Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 293 Md. 69, 76, 441 A.2d 1064, 1069 (1982);
State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 513, 457 A.2d 463, 466 (1983); Township of Chester v.
Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 369, 373, 433 A.2d 1353, 1356 (1981). See generally 4 J.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2 (P. Rohan rev. 3d ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1989).
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consideration all uses for which the land was suited and might in rea-
son be applied.' "18 This test is favored because it is said to be objec-
tive. 19 Departure from the fair market value test is required under the
fifth amendment only when market value cannot accurately or reason-
ably be determined, or when its application would result in manifest
injustice to the owner or the public. 20 Though no other test has been
applied in Alaska, the Alaska Supreme Court has suggested the stan-
dard might be abandoned if it resulted in less than full indemnification
to the landowner for a taking.21
B. Inverse 'Condemnation
"Inverse condemnation" is a shorthand description of the manner
in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his
property when formal condemnation proceedings have not been insti-
tuted.22 The United States Supreme Court has described it as a "cause
of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant,
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency."' 23 The taking can result from
physical invasion of the land resulting from governmental activities 24
18. Gackstetter, 618 P.2d at 565 n.2 (quoting 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMi-
NENT DOMAIN § 12.211] (P. Rohan 3d ed. 1979)). Accord United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1979); United States v. 760.807 Acres of Land,
731 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. 1,291.83 Acres of Land, 411
F.2d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. 104 Acres, 666 F. Supp. 1017, 1020
(W.D. Mich. 1937); State v. 7.026 Acres, 466 P.2d 364, 365 (Alaska 1970); Wronow-
ski v. Redevelopment Agency, 180 Conn. 579, 585, 430 A.2d 1284, 1287 (1980);
Wright v. Metropolitan Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 248 Ga. 372, 375, 283 S.E.2d 466,
469 (1981); City of Elko v. Zillich, 100 Nev. 366, 370, 683 P.2d 5, 8 (1984). See
generally 4 J. SACKMAN, supra note 17, § 12.21].
19. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1984) (alternate
method of compensation, equal to the cost of acquiring a substitute facility, was too
subjective); Gackstetter, 618 P.2d at 567.
20. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1984) (citation
omitted).
21. State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 736-37 n.4 (Alaska 1987); Babinec v. State, 512
P.2d 563, 570 (Alaska 1973); Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 150-
51 (Alaska 1971).
22. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5 n.6; Brazil v. City of Auburn, 93 Wash. 2d 484,
490-91, 610 P.2d 909, 912-13 (1980).
23. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND CONTROL DEVELOPMENT LAw 328 (1971) (emphasis
deleted)).
24. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5 (citing United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21-
22 (1958), and United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 747-49 (1947)); Bakke v.
State, 744 P.2d 655 (Alaska 1987) (state's logging operation damaged landowner's
property); City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324 (Alaska 1975) (city refused to
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or from an incursive regulation promulgated in exercise of police pow-
ers.2 5 Once liability is established, compensation rules applicable to
formal condemnation cases are followed.2 6
The question of what interest, if any, the governmental defendant
obtains in the property once liability has been established is often
treated as an afterthought in the reported cases. When the invasion is
physical, some courts require the landowner to convey an interest to
the condemnor upon receipt of compensation. This interest will be an
easement unless the landowner has established that he has lost all
value of the property, in which case a fee simple may be conveyed.2 7
Alternatively, some courts simply order the agency to institute formal
condemnation procedures,2 8 which, as previously discussed,2 9 will
limit the rights Which the agency can acquire. In either case, the land-
owner will be compensated for the value of the property interest
taken.30 The appropriate remedy for a regulatory taking is more con-
troversial, but usually requires invalidation of the challenged regula-
tion, thereby forcing the government either to initiate formal
condemnation proceedings to take the property or to revise the regula-
tion to make it less restrictive.3'
remove power lines from landowner's property); State v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724
(Alaska 1966) (state appropriated land for a highway).
25. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980); Penn Central Trans.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978); Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
26. See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
27. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931, 934 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Salton Bay
Marina v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 172 Cal. App. 3d 914, 962-63, 218 Cal. Rptr. 839,
868-69 (Ct. App. 1985); Harris v. L.P. and H. Constr. Co., 441 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1969); Balken v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 A.D.2d 579, 579, 416 N.Y.S.2d
51, 52 (1979); Cochran v. City of Charlotte, 53 N.C.App. 390, 406-07, 281 S.E.2d 179,
191 (Ct. App. 1981). But see Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, 470 F.2d 148,
150-51 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973); Steiger v. City of San Diego,
163 Cal. App. 110, 117, 329 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1958); Commonwealth v. Gisborne,
391 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). In the latter three cases, damages were
awarded but the property owners did not convey formal easements.
28. See, e.g., Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1984);
State ex rel. McCormick v. Miller, 297 S.E.2d 448, 450 (W. Va. 1982).
29. See text supra at Section II.A and notes 11-16.
30. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931, 933-34 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Salton
Bay Marina v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 172 Cal. App. 3d 914, 963-64, 218 Cal. Rptr.
839, 869-70 (Ct. App. 1985).
31. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 308-09 (1987); Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (D.R.I.
1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 1340 (1st Cir. 1987). First English further requires that com-
pensation be paid to the landowner for any temporary loss he may have suffered
before the regulation was invalidated. 482 U.S. at 321.
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III. STATE v. DOYLE
State v. Doyle 32 involved claims by owners of residential proper-
ties located in the overflight path of a new runway at Anchorage Inter-
national Airport that their properties had been damaged by noise
resulting from use of the runway.33 The superior court awarded sub-
stantial compensation to the landowners on the theory that an aviga-
tion easement over the properties had been inversely condemned, and
the state appealed the decision. 34 The state contended that the land-
owners had not established that the value of their properties had been
diminished by the aircraft noise and that the mere slowing of the rate
of appreciation in the properties' values which the landowners claimed
had resulted from the noise did not require compensation from the
state. 35 The state also challenged, as clearly erroneous, the superior
court's findings that the landowners' experts were "competent apprais-
ers," and that those experts' conclusions that the properties suffered
compensable damages in particular amounts should be given "substan-
tial weight" in determining the compensation award.36 The court, re-
jecting all of the state's contentions, affirmed the superior court's
award. 37
The court considered it "established that the proper measure of
damages in an eminent domain proceeding in Alaska is the difference
in the fair market value of the property before and after the taking."'38
It noted, however, that just compensation required by article I, section
18 of the Alaska Constitution 39 "implies full indemnification to the
owner for the property taken."' 40 The court, relying on decisions from
California and Washington, 41 then held that a claim for loss of appre-
ciation of property is compensable if that appreciation could have been
realized at the time of taking, had the taking not occurred. 42
The court then turned to the lower court's findings and conclu-
sions. The lower court had entered a conclusion of law that compen-
sation was required even when the properties showed no decrease in
32. 735 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1987).
33. Id. at 734.
34. Id. at 735.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 738.
37. Id. at 743.
38. Id. at 735.
39. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18.
40. Doyle, 735 P.2d at 736 (quoting Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491
P.2d 143, 150 (Alaska 1971)).
41. Id. at 736-37 (citing Steiger v. City of San Diego, 163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329
P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1958); Highline School Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d
6, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976)).
42. Id. at 737.
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value after the taking,43 but then entered a finding of fact that the
landowners' appraisers were of the opinion that the properties had di-
minished in value as of the taking date.44 The Alaska Supreme Court
interpreted the finding of fact to mean that the properties had dimin-
ished in value relative to comparable properties outside the area im-
pacted by the noise45 and found support for the finding in the
appraisal testimony. 46 One of the landowners' appraisers opined that
the impacted properties appreciated at a rate of only 13.7% compared
to a rate of 16% for comparable non-impacted properties. 47 This testi-
mony was also found to support the lower court's finding that the
properties had "suffered compensable damage" totalling $488,000.48
Over the state's objection that there was no relationship, mathematical
or otherwise, between the difference in appreciation rates and the dam-
ages awarded, the court found the award supported by the evidence,
noting that the rates were trends or averages from which the actual
appreciation of the properties involved might differ significantly. 49
IV. THE "BEFORE AND AFTER" MEASURE OF COMPENSATION
The "before and after" method of computing damages for ease-
ment acquisitions is widely accepted and employed.50 Though rarely
noted, the test requires the parties, their appraisers and the trier of fact
to engage in an elaborate fiction:
43. Id. at 735 n.2.
44. Id. at 738 (quoting Finding No. 34).
45. Id. at 738 n.8.
46. Id. at 738.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 739.
49. Id.
50. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 630, 632 (1961).
See also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 253 (1934); United States v. 8.41 Acres
of Land, 680 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986); United
States v. 1,138.15 Acres of Land, 441 F. Supp. 433, 433, 434 (W.D. Okla. 1977);
Redevelopment Agency of Concord v. Tobriner, 153 Cal. App. 3d 367, 372, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 364, 367 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984); Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Scott, 563 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Colonial Pipeline Co. v.
Gimbel, 54 Md. App. 32, 38, 456 A.2d 946, 950 (1983); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Cable, 585 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Okla. 1978); Canyon View Ranch v. Basin Elec. Power
Corp., 628 P.2d 530, 541 (Wyo. 1981). See generally 4 J. SACKMAN, supra note 17,
§ 12.41[2] (stating the "before and after" test as the method "normally" used and
discussing avigation easements specifically). Arkansas appears to be the only jurisdic-
tion with a different rule, namely, that the landowner is entitled to the full fair market
value of the area encompassed by the easement plus any damages to the remainder
tract. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cates, 10 Ark. App. 426, 428-29, 664
S.W.2d 897, 898 (1984). Louisiana employs a method whereby the easement is valued
as a percentage of the fee value of the land, the percentage determined by the extent of
the allowed uses, and the highest and best use of the servient land. See Dixie Elec.
Membership Corp. v. Watts, 268 So. 2d 128, 132 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
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[T]he market value of the property before and after the imposition
or taking is used as the measure of loss or damage. This question is,
how does the easement affect the market price of the property?
Here again we have the willing and intelligent buyer and seller,
neither acting under compulsion. They agree upon a price before
the easement is imposed. But before the sale is closed the easement
is imposed. They meet again, both willing to deal on the basis, of
course, of the fair market value. But the situation is changed in one
particular - the imposition of the easement or easements. The
question is, how does the changed situation affect the market price?
The willing prospective buyer examines the instrument creating the
outstanding easement as to its terms, whether it is perpetual; to
what extent does it limit the use of the servient estate, and what are
the maximum uses granted by the instrument? All in all, how much
less valuable do the outstanding easements make the whole
property, 5 1
To place this test in perspective, it is helpful to compare it with
methods for valuing the fee. The appraisal approach most favored by
the courts for valuation of the fee is the "market data," or "sales com-
parison" approach.5 2 That method infers a value for the property in
issue (the "subject") by analyzing sales of comparable properties.5 3
First, the actual prices at which the properties have been sold are ad-
justed for differences in time, location and other physical characteris-
tics from a theoretical sale of the subject. 54 The subject's value is then
derived from a reconciliation of these adjusted values.55 The critical
difference between these two methods of appraisal is that the fee value
is inferred directly from data derived from a market for that particular
interest while the "before and after" technique indirectly infers the
value of the easement acquired from its impact on the value of another
type of interest, namely, the fee simple. Both processes involve a great
deal of subjectivity, but the "before and after" test is one step further
away from objective data than is valuation of the fee.
An easement acquired by a public agency is normally for a spe-
cific purpose, such as construction of a pipeline, that is uniquely
within the authority of the public agency.56 This limited right has no
51. United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811, 821
(E.D. Tenn. 1941).
52. J. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 137 (1982).
53. AM. INST. OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE
311 (9th ed. 1987) [hereinafter AM. INST.]; J. EATON, supra note 52, at 137.
54. AM. INST., supra note 53, at 316-17; J. EATON, supra note 52, at 145.
55. AM. INST., supra note 53, at 339; J. EATON, supra note 52, at 159.
56. See Angers, Valuation of Pipeline Servitudes, 40 APPRAISAL J. 114, 118 (Jan.
1972); Carll, Valuation of Transmission Line Rights of Way, AM. INST. OF REAL ES-
TATE APPRAISERS, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL PRACTICE 264 (1961). See also
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1960) (flowage easement
condemned for resevoir construction).
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utility to others and probably will be useful to the acquiring agency
only if assembled, for example, with other similar rights on other par-
cels along the route of the pipeline.57 A real estate market, however,
presupposes multiple buyers and sellers of items which are approxi-
mate substitutes for one another.58 Easements, therefore, cannot be
considered to be traded in a market or have market value in and of
themselves.5 9 The absence of a market value for easements necessi-
tates the "before and after" rule as the substitute measure of
compensation. 60
Condemnors, of course, frequently are able to negotiate the acqui-
sition of easements without resort to court proceedings. 61 These sales
might initially seem to constitute a "market," with the prices paid for
the easements establishing a data base for reference in determining the
value of a comparable easement. Nearly all jurisdictions, however, in-
cluding Alaska, hold that evidence of sales even of fee interests to a
condemnor is not relevant to prove the value of a similar acquisition. 62
Such sales are thought to be tainted by the spectre of litigation that
may induce the landowner to accept less or the agency to pay more
than the value of the land in order to avoid the cost and headache of
formal condemnation litigation.63 Since the participants in such a
transaction are not "willing but not obliged to" 64 make the sale, one of
the defined preconditions for a fair market sale is not met.65 Any in-
ference from such sales about the fair market value of another acquisi-
tion is therefore so problematic that the courts simply refrain from
basing awards on this method of calculation.
57. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256-58 (1934). See Angers, supra note
56, at 118.
58. See AM. INST., supra note 53, at 35-36.
59. Carll, supra note 56, at 264.
60. See United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633-35 (1960);
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
61. The United States Department of Transportation reported that in calendar
year 1986, for example, 90 to 95% of the tracts needed for federal-aid highway
projects through the Federal Highway Administration were obtained by the state de-
partment of transportation through negotiation at the administrative or pre-trial level.
O.R. Colan Associates, Inc., APPRAISAL FEDERAL INELIGIBILITY NOTIFICATION
STUDY (April 24, 1987) (prepared for the Florida State Department of
Transportation).
62. Alaska State Housing Auth. v. DuPont, 439 P.2d 427, 429 (Alaska 1968); see
generally 5 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.33 (P. Rohan rev. 3d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989) (citing numerous authorities supporting rule).
63. See Alaska State Housing, 439 P.2d at 429 (stating that such sales are consid-
ered involuntary). See generally 5 J. SACKMAN, supra note 62, § 21.33.
64. Gackstetter v. State, 618 P.2d 564, 565 n.2 (Alaska 1980) (quoting 4 J.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.211] (P. Rohan 3d ed. 1979)).
65. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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V. THE APPRAISAL OF EASEMENTS
While the appraisal of real estate in general has been described as
an inexact science,66 the application of the "before and after" test to a
particular easement is an especially difficult task for an appraiser. 67
There are several approaches to this test, each varying in degree of
practicability.
A. Sales Comparison
The most straightforward application of the test is to employ the
sales comparison method. As applied to assess the amount of a nega-
tive adjustment to the value of a subject parcel of property, the ap-
proach is sometimes called the paired data set analysis. 68 This method
requires the appraiser to locate sales of properties that are subject to
an easement similar to the one in issue and then to find sales of the
same or similar properties without such an easement. 69 The appraiser
then adjusts the prices indicated for those transactions to account for
any differences other than the presence of the easement and calculates
the differences between the adjusted prices for pairs of properties.70
The appraiser concludes by reviewing the amounts of the differences
and forming an opinion on the amount of negative adjustment to mar-
ket value of the properties attributable to the easement. 7' Finally, he
applies this negative adjustment to the value of the subject parcel with-
out the easement. 72 The difference between the unadjusted and ad-
justed values ("before and after") is the required just compensation.
This method is reliable because the negative adjustment for the subject
easement must bear at least some relation to the negative adjustments
computed from objective data, the paired sales.
The chief problem with the paired sales method is that it can
rarely be employed practically. First, actual transactions involving
comparable properties with and without easements frequently do not
exist. 73 Second, the cost of the research necessary to find the data
often is far in excess of the resources that the condemnor and the land-
owner are willing and able to expend.74 Third, the cost of the research
66. Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 151 (Alaska 1971).
67. J. EATON, supra note 52, at 264.
68. See AM. INST., supra note 53, at 324-25.
69. See id. (describing a general paired data set analysis).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 325-29.
72. See id.
73. AM. INST., supra note 53, at 325; Dempsey, The DUPA Technique for Electric
Transmission-line Easement Acquisitions, 49 APPRAISAL J. 382, 382 (July 1981); Hen-
nessy, Right of Way Appraisal Practice, 14 VALUATION 57, 60 (Fall 1965).
74. See, e.g., J. EATON, supra note 52, at 264-65 (discussing nominal damages
caused by easements).
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far exceeds the amount of compensation which reasonably is antici-
pated to be found by the study.75
In connection with the second and third points above, it is impor-
tant to note that a great many easement acquisitions involve signifi-
cantly less damages than the amount claimed by plaintiffs' appraisers
in Doyle. 76 This is illustrated by the Alaska case of Scavenius v. City of
Anchorage,77 in which the plaintiff condemned easements for the con-
struction, use and maintenance of a sanitary sewer line.78 Before trial,
a court-appointed master had awarded just compensation of $516.00
for the taking.79 At trial, the city's appraiser testified that there had
been no impact on the market value of the property and the jury
awarded no compensation. 0 The Alaska Supreme Court found the
decision to be supported by the evidence,8' but failed to respond deci-
sively to the question of whether the failure to award any compensa-
tion violated the landowner's constitutional rights.82
When just compensation is non-existent or particularly low, ap-
praisal costs become very significant relative to the size of the award.
Moreover, the landowner in Alaska is further deterred from obtaining
his own appraisal by special procedural rules that limit his right to be
reimbursed for costs he incurs in the proceedings.8 3 When the con-
demned property is worth too little to warrant an appraisal, appraisal
costs are deemed not "necessary" and will not be awarded to the
landowner.8 4
An additional problem with the paired sales method is the possi-
ble overriding impact on property value of factors other than the ease-
ment. Frequently, the appraiser must make adjustments for other
factors influencing property values that have a much greater impact on
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., id. at 264-65 (discussing nominal damages from easements gener-
ally); Butler, A New Look at Partial Takings, 50 APPRAISAL J. 591, 593 (Oct. 1982)
(no before and after differences from transmission line easements found); Rhodes, Air
Rights, Subsurface Easements and Other Fractional Interests, 42 APPRAISAL J. 261,
271 (Apr. 1974) (no damage to remaining farmland by electrical transmission line
easements).
77. 539 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1975).
78. Id. at 1162.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1162-63.
81. Id. at 1167.
82. Id. at 1165.
83. Stewart & Grindle, Inc. v. State, 524 P.2d 1242, 1249-51 (Alaska 1974) (con-
struing ALASKA R. Civ. P. Rule 72(k)). See State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp.,
630 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980); Badger Constr. Co. v. State, 628 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1981).
84. Stewart & Grindle, 524 P.2d at 1250. The "prevailing party" doctrine in
Alaska, which awards costs in civil litigation, is not applicable in condemnation pro-
ceedings. See City of Anchorage v. Scavenius, 539 P.2d 1169, 1175-76 (Alaska 1975).
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prices than the presence or absence of an easement.8 5 The amount by
which the prices are adjusted for a factor such as time may exceed
vastly that portion of the price differential attributable to the ease-
ment. Put another way, the difference in value allegedly attributable to
the presence of the easement may be nothing more than imprecision in
the manner in which the raw prices were adjusted for more significant
influences.
B. Income Approach
A second method of applying the "before and after" test focuses
on the ability of the subject parcel to earn income.8 6 An appraiser's
testimony with respect to this factor has been accepted as evidence of
the diminution in value attributable to an electric transmission line
easement in City of Anchorage v. Nesbett. 8 7
In Nesbett, the technique was applied to undeveloped land by first
positing a structure or improvement on the land which would repre-
sent its highest and best use.88 The appraiser then estimated the an-
nual market rent which that improvement could be expected to
produce.89 Dividing that figure by an estimated market rate of return
produced a capitalized value for market rent, representing the amount
that a theoretical investor interested solely in income would pay for
the property.90 The appraiser then considered what effect the imposi-
tion of the easement would have on the hypothetical improvement. 91
Potential impacts include complete elimination of the feasibility of
building the structure, reduction in the structure's size or increases in
the cost of developing the structure. The impact in Nesbett was that
the size of the hypothetical structure was reduced.92 After determin-
ing the effect of the easement, the appraiser must then estimate the
value of the servient parcel in the same fashion indicated above.93
It could be argued at this juncture that the difference between the
two land values as indicated by income capitalization is the value of
the easement. This difference, however, is between the value of the
land and a hypothetical building before and after the easement has
85. See AM. INST., supra note 53, at 325.
86. For discussion of the income approach to valuation generally, see AM. INST.,
supra note 53, at 407-26; J. EATON, supra note 52, at 116-35.
87. 530 P.2d 1324, 1334 (Alaska 1975). See also United States v. 104 Acres, 666
F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (easement for noninterference with radio
signal).
88. Nesbett, 530 P.2d at 1332 n.24.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See text supra at Section V.B and notes 88-91.
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been imposed. To provide a meaningful figure for the actual parcel of
land, the appraiser must be able to relate the difference to the unim-
proved land. The appraiser in Nesbett proceeded to derive a ratio be-
tween the before and after values which reflected the percentage of
depreciation caused by the easement. 94 He then applied the ratio to
the value of the fee simple interest in the unimproved land (as deter-
mined by the sales comparison method) to arrive at a value of that
land after imposition of the easement. 95 The difference between the
"after" value and the fair market value of the land represented his
opinion of just compensation. 96
Income capitalization is now generally recognized by appraisers
as an acceptable means of valuing fee interests or leaseholds. 97 If the
parcel containing the easement produces income and the easement can
be shown to directly affect that income stream, just compensation
could be estimated by dividing the reduction in net income attributa-
ble to the easement by the capitalization rate. While the capitalization
rate is always an approximation, reliable sources of market data exist
for estimating it.98 The reduction of net income, however, can only be
found in market data by comparing market rents or incomes from
paired data sets of properties with and without the easement. As indi-
cated previously, paired data sets are rarely available. 99
In this writer's experience though, easements rarely directly im-
pact income either by reducing gross income or by increasing ex-
penses, and the reported cases contain few examples where such an
impact was found.100 And where, as in Nesbett, an income producing
use for the property must be hypothesized, the approach becomes
quite fanciful. While hypothetical use of property must often be pos-
tulated in order that property may be valued at its highest and best
use, the Nesbett approach requires two such hypothetical improve-
ments, one without the easement imposed and the other with it.
Moreover, a comparison of these two structures does not yield the
amount of just compensation but rather only a ratio to be applied to
the value of the unimproved land. At this point, the method becomes
far removed from any objective market data.
94. Nesbett, 530 P.2d at 1332.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See AM. INST., supra note 53, at 408-09, 420-23; J. EATON, supra note 52, at
116.
98. See AM. INST., supra note 53, at 472-78.
99. See supra text at Section V.A and accompanying notes 73-75.
100. United States v. 104 Acres, 666 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mich. 1987), appears to
be one instance where such impact was found. The court there did not capitalize the
difference in income attributable to the easement, however, but used the income ap-
proach to assist it in determining property values before and after the taking.
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C. The Deductive Percentage
The limitations of the paired sales and income approaches have
led to a recurring paradox. These techniques frequently enable the
appraiser to say only that the difference in the before and after values
of the property is not measurable or, more affirmatively, that there is
no difference. 10 Such a conclusion is intuitively unsatisfactory. The
condemnor values the easement highly enough to attempt to negotiate
its acquisition and, if necessary, to commence judicial proceedings. At
the same time, however, the compensation indicated by appraisal is
zero or nominal. Cases like Scavenius are the result.
This paradox may be responsible for a common practice in the
appraisal of easements. Some appraisers will simply state an opinion
that the value of the fee interest has been diminished by a given per-
centage.'0 2 This percentage is then multiplied by the value of the fee
interest in the land affected by the easement to produce just compensa-
tion. 103 Often the appraiser offers only his experience or judgment asjustification for the percentage selected. 104 Such a practice cannot be
considered as an objective or scientific measurement; rather it is a con-
clusion reached a priori without reference to any data base. Since the
practice appears to be grounded in some unarticulated general notion
of what is fair, the approach will be generously described herein as the
deductive percentage method. It might also be given another label:
speculation.
D. Judicial Acceptance of Easement Valuation Testimony
The difficulty and uncertainty inherent in determining the impact
of an easement on the value of land justifies greater judicial scrutiny of
valuation testimony than might be exercised in cases involving fee
takes. Three evidentiary limitations are implicated. First, the require-
ment of Rule 701 of both the Alaska and Federal Rules of Evidence
that lay opinion testimony be limited to that which is rationally based
101. See J. EATON, supra note 52, at 264.
102. The practice is noted and discouraged in L. CLARK & F. TREADWAY, IM-
PACT OF ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION LINE EASEMENTS ON REAL ESTATE
VALUES 16 (1972); G. SCHMUTZ, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 211-12
(1963); Angers, supra note 56, at 122. It is unwittingly illustrated in Siemers, The
Value of Pipe Line Easements, APPRAISAL DIGEST at 11, 14 (July-Sept. 1969); Webb,
Appraisal of Rights of Way and Easements, ENCYLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE AP-
PRAISING 752 (E. Friedman 3d ed. 1978).
103. See sources cited supra note 102.
104. See the testimony of the landowner's expert in Miller v. State, 117 Misc. 2d
444, 451, 458 N.Y.2d 973, 978 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Wheeler, 551
S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. 1977).
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on the perception of the witness 10 5 would normally be expected to ex-
clude lay valuation testimony where an easement is taken. Lay wit-
nesses are unlikely to be familiar with the methodologies described
above for rationally determining the valuation impact of an easement
and, hence, less likely to make rational comparisons of similar proper-
ties. In addition, since there is no true market for easements, the lay
witness cannot form an opinion based on his observation or familiarity
with such a market. 10 6 Second, lay and expert testimony must be scru-
tinized carefully to determine whether it actually assists the trier of
fact in calculating just compensation.10 7 Appraisal testimony which in
essence is based on the deductive percentage approach fails to meet
this test as it is founded on the appraiser's notion of fairness rather
than on data or knowledge generally unavailable to a typical juror.
Third, courts should be particularly attentive in easement cases to the
rule that expert testimony is inadmissible if grounded in specula-
tion. 10 8 The income approach to valuing easements should be subject
to careful scrutiny under this rule in light of its speculative nature.
The reported cases, however, do not distinguish between ease-
ment and fee takings in applying evidentiary rules and only minimally
scrutinize appraisal testimony in any context, whether fee or easement.
Thus, the well established rule that the lay landowner is competent to
105. FED. R. EVID. 701; ALASKA R. EvID. 701.
106. Where an easement and the servient property are sufficiently similar to those
in the instant case, lay testimony from participants in a sale of such property may
assist the trier of fact. The impact of the easement on the participants in the bargain-
ing process would be probative. Testimony regarding this impact technically would
not constitute opinion testimony, but rather direct evidence about a comparable sale
transaction. Direct evidence about a comparable sale transaction is admissible to
prove market value. See, e.g., Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App.
723, 724, 278 S.E.2d 429, 430 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Taylor v. City of Des Moines, 337
N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). See generally 5 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.3[1] (P. Rohan rev. 3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
107. See FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (allowing the testimony of expert witnesses only if
such testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue"). Accord ALASKA R. EVID. 702(a).
108. FED. R. EVID. 703; ALASKA R. EVID. 703. As to expert testimony generally,
see, e.g., Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1293 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 586 F.2d 1291
(8th Cir. 1978); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., 540 F. Supp. 1163, 1172-73
(E.D. Pa. 1982), afftd, 729 F.2d 943 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984);
Fletcher v. Department of Roads, 216 Neb. 342, 351, 344 N.W.2d 899, 904 (1984);
Leon, Ltd. v. Carver, 104 N.M. 29, 35, 715 P.2d 1080, 1086 (1986). As recognized
specifically in condemnation of fee interests, see, e.g., United States v. 0.161 Acres,
837 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. 341.45 Acres, 633 F.2d 108,
111 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Washington Metro Area Trans.
Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 450 F. Supp. 122, 126-27 (D. Md. 1978); Tandet v.
Urban Redevelopment Comm'n, 179 Conn. 293, 300, 426 A.2d 280, 284 (1979); Daw-
son v. Papio Natural Resources Dist., 206 Neb. 225, 232-33, 292 N.W.2d 42, 47
(1980).
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testify about the value of his own property' 0 9 is construed broadly to
allow the landowner to testify about the impact of an easement on the
value of his property." 0 With respect to expert appraisal opinion,
some courts have adopted a rule in easement and fee takings allowing
the appraiser, once qualified, to offer his opinion as testimony, with the
109. See United States v. 79.20 Acres of Land, 710 F.2d 1351, 1357 (8th Cir.
1983); Gasser v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 476, 507 (1988); State v. Compton, 502 So.
2d 1205, 1207-08 (Ala. 1987); Coffelt v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 285 Ark.
314, 318, 686 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987); State Dep't
of Highways v. Pigg, 656 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Georgia Power Co. v.
Bishop, 162 Ga. App. 122, 124-25, 290 S.E.2d 328, 331 (Ct. App. 1982); City of Free-
port v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 218, 222, 423 N.E.2d 924, 928 (Ct. App.
1981); Brannon v. State Roads Comm'n of State Highway Admin., 305 Md. 793, 801,
506 A.2d 634, 638-39 (1986); City of Elko v. Zillich, 100 Nev. 366, 371, 683 P.2d 5, 8
(1984); Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 270-71, 302 S.E.2d
204, 214 (1983); Redevelopment Auth. of Harrisburg v. Young Women's Christian
Ass'n, 44 Pa. Commw. 295, 298-99, 403 A.2d 1343, 1345-46 (1979); Arkansas Louisi-
ana Gas Co. v. Allison, 620 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). But see Depart-
ment of Transp. v. Kirk, 138 Ga. App. 180, 181, 225 S.E.2d 781, 782 (Ct. App. 1976)
(An owner may not testify to the value of his goods in a single or gross amount with-
out giving his reasons therefor, or else showing that he has had an opportunity for
forming a correct opinion.); Department of Highways v. Fister, 373 S.W.2d 720, 722-
23 (Ky. 1963) (The qualifications of the owner witness, as with other witnesses, must
be affirmatively shown before his opinion of market values is expressed.); Pankauski v.
Greater Lawrence Sanitary Dist. Comm'n, 13 Mass. App. 929, 930, 430 N.E.2d 1228,
1230 (App. Ct. 1982) (The question, however, of whether an owner has sufficient
knowledge to permit him to testify as to the value of his own property, is a preliminary
question of fact to be decided by the trial judge, whose decision is conclusive unless
upon the evidence it was erroneous as a matter of law.); Lustig v. U.M.C. Indus., 637
S.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("An owner of real estate may testify regarding
his opinion of its value, even though he is not an expert in such matters, since an
owner is presumed to be familiar with the property and its uses; but, if the record
shows the owner does not have special knowledge, the presumption is overcome and
evidence of his opinion of the value of the property should be rejected."); Utah Dep't
of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah 1984) (holding that ownership of
property alone is not sufficient to qualify the owner as an expert on the "highest and
best use" of the property).
110. See, e.g., Board of Directors v. Calvaresi, 156 Colo. 173, 177, 397 P.2d 877,
879 (1964); Georgia Power Co. v. Bishop, 162 Ga. App. 122, 123-24, 290 S.E.2d 328,
331 (Ct. App. 1982); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Allied Mfrs., Inc., 574 S.W.2d 509,
512 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). See also Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co.,
625 P.2d 214, 217 (Wyo. 1981) (testimony of president of corporation owning land as
a value of parcel admitted but insufficient because it did not value land before and
after easement). But see Smith v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 236 Md. 51, 60, 202 A.2d
604, 609 (1964) (president of corporation owning land not permitted to testify as
owner); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Allison, 620 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex. Civ.
App.), modified on other grounds, 624 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1981) (landowner could not
testify to mere conclusion as to market value but must show nature of damage, effect
on parcels and relationships of same to market value).
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reasoning and logic behind it going to the weight rather than the ad-
missibility of the testimony. I1 ' Other courts require a minimal show-
ing of the rationality of the opinion before such testimony will be
admitted.11 2 Courts specifically addressing the deductive percentage
approach in valuing easements are divided over its admissibility.11 3
The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted a general policy in condemna-
tion cases of "liberal and flexible" admission of appraisal testimony. 14
The court justifies this policy by emphasizing that the appraisal of real
estate is an inexact science, and that therefore each party must be af-
forded "latitude" in presenting evidence with respect to
compensation.' Is
VI. DOYLE" JUDICIAL IMPOTENCE
The combined impact on the integrity of the easement condemna-
tion process of the "before and after" rule, the limitations of appraisal
methods and the judicial deference to appraisal opinions is glaringly
apparent in Doyle. Though the testimony of the various appraisers is
mentioned only briefly in the decision," 1 6 the central appraisal problem
in the case was to extract the value impact of an avigation easement
111. See, e.g., State v. Dillingham Corp., 60 Haw. 393, 411, 591 P.2d 1049, 1060
(1979); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Wheeler, 551 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Texas 1977). See also
Department of Transp. v. Pilgrim, 175 Ga. App. 576, 579-80, 333 S.E.2d 866, 870
(1985) (noting that the credibility and weight of appraisal opinion is determined by the
jury). See generally Comment, Real Estate Valuation in Condemnation Cases - The
Place of the Expert, 43 NEB. L. REV. 137 (Dec. 1963).
112. See United States v. 77,819.10 Acres, 647 F.2d 104, 108 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982) (opinions must have rational foundation to be probative);
United States v. 97.19 Acres, 582 F.2d 878, 882-83 (4th Cir. 1978) (expert may arrive
at opinions in any way a man of intelligence would have arrived at a valuation of the
property for business purposes); Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Sain, 262 Ark. 326,
327-28, 556 S.W.2d 441, 442 (1977) (an expert's opinion testimony must have a sound
and reasonable basis); Dawson v. Papio Natural Resources Dist., 206 Neb. 225, 233,
292 N.W.2d 42, 47 (1980) (where the opinion testimony of an expert witness does not
have a sound and reasonable basis it should be stricken); Nasco, Inc. v. Director of
Pub. Works, 116 R.I. 712, 721, 360 A.2d 871, 876 (1976) (an expert's opinion based
solely on the witness's experience in evaluating property, without detailing any specific
reasons or factors, is entitled to no weight).
113. Compare Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Wheeler, 551 S.W.2d 341, 342-43 (Texas
1977), with Miller v. State, 117 Misc. 2d 444, 450-51, 458 N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (1982).
See also cases dealing with fear of utility facilities as basis of expert conclusion of
diminished value: Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cable, 585 P.2d 1113 (Okla. 1978);
Annotation, Fear of Powerline, Gas or Oil Pipeline, or Related Structure as Element of
Damages in Easement Condemnation Proceeding, 23 A.L.R. 4th 631 (1983).
114. Dash v. State, 491 P.2d 1069, 1076 (Alaska 1971). See also Babinec v. State,
512 P.2d 563, 568, 571 (Alaska 1973) (restrictive judicial rules on expert testimony
adopted elsewhere invade province of trier of fact in condemnation proceedings).
115. See State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 738 n.7 (Alaska 1987).
116. Id. at 737.
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from sales data known to be strongly influenced by appreciation due to
general market conditions.' 17 In such circumstances, the comparable
sales approach may not show any loss in value, as illustrated by the
following example.
Assume a property lies within the area impacted by the noise. Its
value before the easement is estimated by reviewing sales of compara-
ble properties that occurred before the valuation date. Its post-ease-
ment value is estimated by reviewing sales of properties within the
impacted area that occur sufficiently after the valuation date to allow
the market to react to the presence of the easement. These sales must
then be discounted or adjusted backward at an appreciation rate
(which in "hot" markets may be as much as 1% per month or
more) 1 s for the period of time elapsed between the valuation date and
the date of the comparable post-easement sale. This yields "after" val-
ues for the parcel adjusted for market appreciation. If the apprecia-
tion rate selected is derived from sales data within'only the impacted
area, a minor loss in value attributable to the easement will not be
revealed at all by the sales comparison approach. Consequently, if the
"after" sales occurred one year following the imposition of the ease-
ment, but property values still appreciated at a rate of 12%, no decline
would be indicated from the before to the after value of the subject
property unless the easement impact exceeded 12%.
A. The Inside/Outside Justification
In Doyle, however, plaintiffs' appraisers were not deterred. Ac-
cording to the limited extract of the testimony in the decision,' " 9 the
impacted properties were valued twice - once by using sales of
properties outside the impacted area and once by using sales inside the
impacted area. The court's recitation of the evidence does not indicate
what, if anything, the appraiser did with these two values other than
conclude that a parcel inside the impacted area was worth substan-
tially less than its counterpart outside the impacted area.' 20
The Doyle court found this testimony sufficient to sustain an
award of compensation to the owner of an impacted parcel.' 2' But
how? The method employed by the landowners' appraisers measured
only the difference in value of similar parcels in two different locations.
117. See id. at 735.
118. In the years following the date of the taking in Doyle, which occurred on Oct.
29, 1980, id., Anchorage realtors believed prices of single-family homes were rising at
18.0%, 12.4% and 10.5% for 1981, 1982 and 1983, respectively. Real Estate Services
Corp., 1988-1989 Survey of the Anchorage Real Estate Market (1988).
119. 735 P.2d at 737.
120. Id. at 737-38.
121. Id. at 738.
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Differences in value due to location can result from a myriad of fac-
tors, including proximity to amenities and quality and size of improve-
ments within the neighborhood. Doyle says nothing about how, if at
all, the plaintiffs' appraisers were able to extract the incremental differ-
ence in value attributable to the avigation easement from the balance
of the difference resulting from the other factors. The opinion offers
no explanation of how the appraiser and the superior court could ra-
tionally use this information to arrive at the damage amounts
awarded. Given the prevalence of the deductive percentage approach,
the inference is that the appraisers applied it here to assign some per-
centage of the locational difference as damage attributable to the
easement.
The court quoted the plaintiffs' appraisers to the effect that the
sales transactions taken from outside the impacted area were "compa-
rable." 1 22 This testimony presumably meant that, in the judgment of
the appraisers, these other properties differed only slightly from the
subject, which differences could be either ignored or reflected in small
adjustments to the actual sale prices. It is therefore possible that dif-
ferences in value attributable to locational factors and not the aviga-
tion easement were handled in this way. If so, then all of the
difference in value between parcels within the impacted area and with-
out could at least arguably be attributed to the easement. The court,
however, did not address this point.
B. Damages from Diminished Appreciation
After discussing the "inside/outside" testimony, the Doyle opin-
ion continues to assert that testimony of a diminished appreciation
rate for the subject parcel is related to and supportive of the lower
court's finding on damages.1 23 Plaintiffs' appraisers found an appreci-
ation rate of 13.7% for the subject parcel while unimpacted parcels
appreciated at an average rate of 16%. 124 The court offers no explana-
tion as to how these percentages were translated into the $488,000
damage award arrived at by the appraisers. The court states only that
"trend analysis alone does not indicate the market value of individual
properties."'' 25 The court concludes by emphasizing testimony that,
rather than supporting the award, undermines the whole conclusion of
damage: "One appraiser also added that the trend of 13.7% for
properties within the subdivision was based on only two sales and re-
sales of properties and thus would not lead to any reliable conclusion
122. Id. at 737.
123. Id. at 738.
124. Id. The unimpacted parcels had rates of appreciation ranging from 13% to
20%. Id.
125. Id. at 739.
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concerning all the homes in the subdivision.'1 26 Again, despite ac-
knowledging the unreliability of the evidence admitted, the court ap-
pears willing to allow an appraiser to leap deductively from any data
relating to the property to a conclusion of damage without requiring
any objective basis for the appraiser's findings.
Loss of future appreciation can be valued theoretically at a given
point in time. The critical assumption concerns at which point in the
future the loss is to be computed. Once this assumption is made, the
appraiser can compute the appreciated values of the property with and
without the easement. The difference between the two prices repre-
sents the loss to the landowner in the future. The amount of compen-
sation for lost appreciation could then be calculated by discounting the
loss to the valuation date. But without some meaningful way of esti-
mating the appreciation period, the whole exercise is inherently
speculative. 127
The court could have refrained from employing a "loss of future
appreciation" rationale by requiring a simple application of the data to
measure plaintiffs' compensation as of the date of take. Adjusting the
sales prices of the properties outside the impacted area for locational
differences other than the avigation easement and discounting them to
the date of taking by the appreciation rate of unimpacted properties
results in values indicative of the value of the subject parcels in the
before condition. Discounting the sales of properties inside the im-
pacted area by the same rate to the same date of take results in values
indicative of the value of the subject properties in the after condi-
tion. 128 The difference between the values so indicated would be the
amount of just compensation.1 29 If the data, adjusted and discounted
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. The appreciation period might equal the period of time which a "typical"
property owner might be expected to hold this type of property before reselling it. At
the point of resale, the landowner's loss of appreciation is translated into a "real,"
rather than a "paper," loss. "Average" holding times, however, are not well docu-
mented except possibly for residential properties. For many commercial or industrial
properties it simply is not possible to estimate a holding period.
128. The after values estimated in this way might differ from the actual prices of
impacted parcels sold near the time of an easement's imposition. On the date of take,
an imperfect distribution of information about the impact of the easement is likely to
exist, meaning that the actual price does not reflect the easement's impact. See United
States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811, 821 (E.D. Tenn.
1941) (stating that the "before and after" method assumes that the "after" price re-
flects the extent to which the easement limits the use of the servient estate).
129. A mathematical explanation may be clearer to some. Define:
x = value of impacted parcel on date of take
y = value of unimpacted but comparable parcel on date of take
ri = appreciation rate of impacted parcels
ru = appreciation rate of unimpacted parcels
Sx = sale price of x at one year after take
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in this way, yield no difference in the before and after values of the
parcel, there is, to use the Doyle formulation, no loss indicated repre-
senting "value that would have been realized as of the date of taking, if
the taking had not occurred."' 130 Since the superior court in Doyle
found no diminution in value of the parcels but still awarded damages,
application of this analysis on appeal would have required remand or
reversal.
C. Inadequate Judicial Process
The court in Doyle reiterates its policy followed in previous cases
that "considerable latitude must be accorded the trier of fact [in con-
demnation proceedings] due to the complicated [and inexact] nature of
[real] property appraisal."' 131 As applied in Doyle to an easement take,
this policy is tantamount to approval of the receipt by trial courts of
Sy = sale price of y at one year after take adjusted for all
differences other than time and easement
Assume:
Sx = 110, Sy = 120, ru = 20%
then Sy = (1 + ru)y
and substituting 120 = (1 + .2)y
120 = 1.2y or y = 100.
Since "before" conditions of x assume no easement and since the presence of an ease-
ment is the only difference between x and y, y = 100 = ' before.
Sx is a sale actually affected by the easement but also affected to some extent by
appreciative forces. To remove the effect of such appreciation:
Sx = (1 + ru)x
110 = (1 + .2)x
91.67 = x = ' after.
Since x as calculated here is affected by the easement but not by appreciation (i.e.,
discounted to the date of take), it is the value of the parcel in the after condition on the
date of take. Thus:
Just Compensation - before - ' after
= 100 - 91.67 = 8.33.
The actual rate of appreciation of impacted parcels need not be known to calcu-
late just compensation but can be calculated:
Sx = (1 + ri)x or x = 110/(1 + ri)
Sy = (I + ru)y or 120 = 1.2y.
If x and y are comparable then:
x = y and
120 = 1.2(110/(1 + ri))
100 = 110/(1 + ri) or 1 + ri = 110/100 = 1.1
ri = .1.
130. Doyle, 735 P.2d at 737.
131. Id. at 738 n.7 (quoting State v. Alaska Continental Bev. Corp., 630 P.2d 977,
987 (Alaska 1980)); Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 568, 571 (Alaska 1973); Ketch-
ikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 151 (Alaska 1971); Dash v. State, 491
P.2d 1069, 1076 (Alaska 1971).
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appraisals which are unrelated by any rational means to objective mar-
ket data regarding the property. Because there is a limitless potential
for differences of opinion between appraisers for the landowner and
appraisers for the condemnor, the potential outcomes in easement con-
demnation cases are unpredictable. The potentially extreme results,
illustrated on the low end by Scavenius and on the high end by Nesbett
and Doyle, render it difficult for either party to assess the risks of liti-
gation and provide little middle ground for settlement.
There is, moreover, reason to believe that the judicial task of de-
termining just compensation in easement cases will become even more
difficult as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 132 Teleprompter in-
volved New York's attempt to require landlords to accept the installa-
tion on their buildings of equipment required to provide cable
television services to tenants without acquiring easements, by condem-
nation or otherwise, for such installation. 133 Even though the equip-
ment displaced a volume of only about one and a half cubic feet, 134 the
Court held that a compensable taking had occurred. 135 The slightest
physical intrusion by the government, therefore, is potentially of con-
stitutional magnitude and requires a determination of just compensa-
tion. The Teleprompter decision, however, offers no additional insight
into valuation formulae. 136
A policy of greater judicial scrutiny of appraisal testimony, how-
ever, which the Doyle court could have followed, also has difficulties.
To the extent that the court excludes testimony based on the deductive
percentage approach as being speculative or inexpert, results similar to
the result in Scavenius are encouraged. Such results tend to impair
landowner confidence in the condemnation process by giving rise to
the paradox described previously. 137 Encouragement of outcomes
which are inadequate from the landowner's perspective is also con-
trary to the well-established principle favoring a liberal interpretation
of constitutional and statutory provisions for the payment of just com-
pensation in condemnation proceedings. 138 Such outcomes undermine
132. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
133. Id. at 421-25.
134. Id. at 438 n.16.
135. Id. at 441 ("We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupa-
tion of property is a taking.").
136. The dissent thought, in part, that the matter was something of a tempest in a
teapot, anticipating that the compensation awarded after remand would be nominal.
Id. at 456 n.12 (l31ackmun, J., dissenting).
137. See supra text at Section V.C.
138. This principle suggests that the landowner's interest in obtaining indemnifica-
tion for his loss should guide the courts unless a contrary interest of the condemnor
clearly indicates some other result. See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d
437, 439-40 (Alaska 1987); Alsop v. State, 586 P.2d 1236, 1239 & n.7 (Alaska 1978);
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the notion, now reaffirmed by Teleprompter, that there has been a tak-
ing. It is therefore understandable, in light of this implicit policy, that
the court in Doyle recoiled from the alternative of zero compensation
that was presented by the state. 139 The case demonstrates, however,
the inability of the traditional judicial process to control the arbitrari-
ness in compensation for easement acquisitions that results from the
limitations inherent in the available appraisal methods. Any reduction
of such arbitrariness must come from other branches of government.
Srb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. App. 14, 18, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Ct.
App. 1979), cert. quashed, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980); Standard Theatres,
Inc. v. Department of Transp., 118 Wis. 2d 730, 743, 349 N.W.2d 661, 669 (1984).
See also Textron, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transp., 176 Conn. 264, 268, 407 A.2d 946,
947 (1978) (Just compensation as required by the federal and state constitutions for
private property taken for public use means the full, perfect and exact equivalent, in
money, for the property taken.); Ives v. Addison, 155 Conn. 334, 341, 232 A.2d 311,
314 (1967) (The paramount law intends that the condemnee shall be put in as good
condition pecuniarily by just compensation as he would have been in had the property
not been taken.); Housing Auth. of Decatur v. Schroeder, 113 Ga. App. 432, 434, 148
S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d 226, opinion conformed to
114 Ga. App. 460, 151 S.E.2d 848 (1966) ("Just and adequate compensation means
putting the deprived land owner as nearly as possible back in the same monetary posi-
tion he was in before the seizure occurred."); King v. State Roads Comm'n, 298 Md.
80, 84, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034 (1983) (" 'Just compensation'" for the taking of property
means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken; the property owner is to be
put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not
been taken."); Commissioner of Transp. v. William G. Rohrer, Inc., 80 N.J. 462, 467,
404 A.2d 29, 31 (1979) ("The just compensation to which an owner is entitled when
his property is taken by eminent domain is regarded in law from the point of view of
the owner and not the condemnor."); Township of Chester v. Department of Transp.,
495 Pa. 369, 373, 433 A.2d 1353, 1355 (1981) ("The fundamental principle underlying
the requirement of 'just compensation' is one of indemnity: a condemnee is entitled to
be placed in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.").
139. The court in Doyle appears to have assumed that a taking had occurred as a
result of the noise. State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 735-36 n.3 (Alaska 1987). The
opinion contains no discussion of how the noise impacted the use and enjoyment of
the landowner's property which normally is the threshold inquiry for determining
whether a taking has occurred. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946)
(flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to
a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land); Davis v.
United States, 295 F.2d 931, 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Impairment of market value resulting
from government action, standing alone, does not result in a taking. See Kirby Forest
Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
1989]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:199
VIi. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the legislative restriction or reduction of compensation due a land-
owner for a taking. 140 The fifth amendment, however, does not pre-
vent a legislature from providing compensation in addition or
supplementary to the compensation to which the landowner would be
entitled under the Constitution;14 state constitutions have been simi-
larly construed.1 42 The procedural requirements for exercising the
power of eminent domain are within the discretion of the legislature,
subject only to the due process clauses of the federal and state consti-
tutions.1 43 The only absolute requirements are that the landowner be
afforded notice and the opportunity to be heard by a properly consti-
tuted tribunal with respect to the amount of compensation to be paid
for the property taken. 144
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the means by which a land-
owner's compensation for an easement acquisition is usually computed
hardly constitutes an objective appraisal method. At the same time,
however, deeply ingrained notions of fairness and the sanctity of prop-
erty cause both landowners and fact finders to revolt at the idea that
no compensation should be awarded merely because it cannot be sys-
tematically calculated. Absent an objective method of determining
just compensation, however, damage awards will, as indicated by the
Alaska experience, vary widely from case to case. Under the current
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also United States v. New River Collieries Co.,
262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923) ("The ascertainment of compensation is a judicial func-
tion and no power exists in any other department of the Government to declare what
the compensation shall be or to prescribe any binding rule in that regard."); Mononga-
hela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325-27 (1893) ("It does not rest
with ... Congress or the legislature ... to say what compensation shall be paid, or
even what shall be the rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared that just
compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry.");
Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 837 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("[Tlhe determination of just
compensation under the fifth amendment is exclusively a judicial function.").
141. See Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1925); Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923).
142. See cases collected at 3 J. SACKMAN, supra note 16, § 8.10[l] n.8.
143. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1921); Port of New York Auth. v. Hem-
ing, 34 N.J. 144, 154, 167 A.2d 609, 614 (1961). The "takings clause" of the fifth
amendment is applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. See,
e.g., De Salvo v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 239 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Ark.
1965).
144. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1971); Goadby v. Philadelphia
Elec., 504 F. Supp. 812, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 639 F.2d 117
(1981); Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. Darrow, 12 Ill. 2d 365, 369-70, 146
N.E.2d 1, 4 (1957); Vinson v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okla. 590, 593, 66 P.2d 933, 936
(1937); Elliot v. Clement, 175 Or. 44, 51-52, 151 P.2d 739, 742 (1944).
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system, the probability is high that similarly situated landowners will
not be treated alike.
Legislative determination of the appropriate amount of compen-
sation in easement acquisitions can provide the needed uniformity in
compensation awards. Legislation, however, that simply provides pre-
determined awards for each easement acquisition has obvious infirmi-
ties. First, to the extent that the landowner can develop appraisal
testimony suggesting his actual damages exceed the legislated amount,
the legislation would potentially violate the fifth amendment. 145 On
the other hand, legislatively mandated compensation that exceeds
amounts which can be proven definitively by appraisal is arguably a
waste of public resources. Finally, legislation may be considered arbi-
trary and potentially in violation of the due process clause if it is not in
some way tailored to the specific property over which the easement is
taken. 146
These objections can be neutralized by adopting a rebuttable pre-
sumption that just compensation in an easement acquisition is equal to
a stated percentage of the fair market value of the fee interest affected
by the easement. 47 While such legislation would not guarantee ade-
quate compensation to the landowner in all cases, it would validate the
perception that no taking of a property right, however restricted, can
occur without the payment of compensation. The landowner would
be entitled to rely upon such a presumption throughout the condem-
nation proceedings, including trial, which would permit him to gener-
ate a fact issue without resort to expensive appraisal testimony.
Presumptively assessing just compensation as a fixed percentage
of the fee value in essence constitutes legislative adoption of the deduc-
tive percentage appraisal method discussed above. 148 The presump-
tion, however, in contrast to the unsupported subjective opinion of one
or more appraisers in a particular case, represents a society's collective
judgment as to what is fair in all cases where the evidence does not
compellingly suggest otherwise. Since the percentage would not vary
across property interests, the legislation would provide uniform com-
pensation to similarly situated landowners. By pegging the award to
the fair market value of the land involved, compensation is tailored
proportionately to the specific properties subject to the easement. By
145. See supra note 140.
146. See generally Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921); cases collected at
lA J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.12[2] n.19 (P. Rohan rev. 3d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
147. Presumptions in aid of constitutional rights are permissible. See Usery v. Tur-
ner Elkhorn Mining Co., 427 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 210 (1973). As to presumptions generally, see ALASKA R. EVID. 301 and
commentary.
148. See text supra at Section V.C and notes 102-104.
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creating only a presumption and not mandating an award, such a stat-
ute preserves the condemnor's opportunity to defeat the presumption
by introducing appraisal testimony before the trier of fact.
Such legislation, however, would still be constitutionally ques-
tionable if it were to bind the landowner who could otherwise produce
evidence that the value of the easement exceeds the amount estab-
lished by operation of the presumption. Under such circumstances,
the presumption would become a substantive rather than a procedural
restriction on the landowner's fifth amendment rights and likely would
be unconstitutional. 49 This infirmity can be cured by providing the
landowner with the right to elect to extinguish the presumption by
giving notice before some reasonable point in the condemnation pro-
cess. Both landowner and condemnor would then proceed to establish
just compensation with the trier of fact not being instructed on the
presumption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A proposed statute embodying the elements discussed in the pre-
vious section follows in the appendix. Adoption of such a statute
would enhance fairness and uniformity in the award of compensation
for easement acquisitions. Appraisers would not be pressured to opine
that a value impact exists when one cannot be rationally calculated.
Landowners and condemnors alike would have a standard in every
case against which they could assess their own positions on just com-
pensation. Such a standard would encourage settlement of compensa-
tion questions without litigation, to the benefit of both condemnors
and landowners. Courts could exercise a healthier skepticism regard-
ing lay and expert valuation testimony that is based on neither rational
method nor objective data. While the legislative determination of the
appropriate percentage of fee value to impose might be difficult and
involve reconciling the desires of conflicting constituencies, the impact
of such legislation on the compensation process could only be
beneficial.
149. See supra note 140.
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APPENDIX
Compensation For Easement Takings. Whenever an easement is taken
for a public use, it shall be presumed that just compensation for such
taking is equal to -% of the fair market value of the fee simple inter-
est in the portion of the parcel of land subject to the easement. Any
party with an interest in the compensation to be awarded for such
easement acquisition may extinguish the presumption created hereby
in any proceeding for the determination of the amount to be paid for
the interest by giving written notice to the court and the parties at
such reasonable time as may be determined by the court, by rule or
otherwise.

